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The rise of the commercial paper market and the subsequent growth of
the junk bond market in the 1980s and 1990s have seemingly reduced the
role of banks in the ﬁnancing of large businesses (Mishkin and Strahan
1998). This much-remarked-upon evolution away from banks and toward
the securities markets has not rendered banks irrelevant (Boyd and Gertler
1994). While they do provide less funding than before, banks remain im-
portant to large ﬁrms as providers of liquidity support to the commercial
paper market. Banks act as the “liquidity provider of last resort” by prom-
ising to oﬀer cash on demand through commercial paper backup lines of
credit.1 This liquidity insurance role became especially notable in the fall
of 1998, when many ﬁrms turned to their banks to provide liquidity nor-
mally supplied by the commercial paper market. During this episode, banks
faced a systematic increase in the demand for liquidity. This paper studies
how banks were able to manage this systematic liquidity risk and thus
weather the 1998 crisis successfully.
Banks have traditionally provided liquidity, not only to borrowers with
open lines of credit and loan commitments (we use these terms interchange-
ably), but also to depositors in the form of checking and other transactions
accounts. Both contracts allow customers to receive liquidity (cash) on short
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1. Banks also continue to bear signiﬁcant credit risk through oﬀ–balance sheet guarantees
such as standby letters of credit.notice. In fact, a ﬁnancial intermediary combining these two products of-
fers a reasonable deﬁnition of what most scholars and regulators mean by
“bank.” This liquidity insurance role exposes banks to the risk that they will
have insuﬃcient cash to meet random demands from their depositors and
borrowers.2
To the extent that liquidity demands are idiosyncratic and therefore in-
dependent across customers, a bank can use scale to mitigate its need to
hold cash to meet unexpected liquidity shocks.3 In fact, Kashyap, Rajan,
and Stein (2002) present a model in which a risk-management motive ex-
plains the combination of transactions deposits and loan commitments: as
long as the demand for liquidity from depositors through the checking ac-
count is not highly correlated with liquidity demands from borrowers, an
intermediary will be able to reduce its need to hold cash by serving both
customers. Thus, their model yields a diversiﬁcation synergy between de-
mand deposits (or transactions deposits more generally) and loan com-
mitments. As evidence, they show that banks oﬀering more transaction de-
posits (as a percentage of total deposits) tend also to make more loan
commitments (also scaled appropriately). The correlation is robust across
all sizes of banks.
A bank oﬀering liquidity insurance may face a problem if, rather than fac-
ing idiosyncraticdemands for cash, it sometimes faces systematicincreases
in liquidity demand. For example, during the ﬁrst week of October 1998,
following the coordinated restructuring of the hedge fund Long-term
Capital Management (LTCM), spreads between safe Treasury securities
and risky commercial paper rose dramatically. Many large ﬁrms were un-
able to roll over their commercial paper as it came due, leading to a sharp
reduction in the amount of commercial paper outstanding and a corre-
sponding increase in takedowns on preexisting lines of credit (Saidenberg 
and Strahan 1999).4 As a result of this liquidity shock, banks faced a sys-
tematic spike in demand for cash because many of their largest customers
wanted funds all at once. Because funding ﬂowed into the banking system,
however, this systematic increase in demand was easily met. Gatev and
Strahan (2003) show that funding supply to banks moves inversely with
market liquidity—that is, when commercial paper spreads widen, banks
face a greater supplyof funds (especially transactions deposits). Thus, when
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2. Liquidity risk has been used to justify government deposit insurance (e.g., Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).
3. In a Modigliani-Miller world, holding cash is not costly. However, in a world with taxes,
ﬁnancial distress, or agency costs, holding cash or other liquid assets is costly for banks and
other ﬁrms (e.g., Myers and Rajan, 1998). Garber and Weisbrod (1990) argue that banks also
have an advantage due to their ability to move liquid assets between banks eﬃciently, thereby
lowering the amount of cash that any individual bank needs to hold.
4. Commercial paper often has maturity as short as one week. Firms, however, routinely
roll over their paper as it matures.liquidity demands are at their highest, so is funding supply. Gatev and Stra-
han argued that banks can weather a liquidity storm due to their perceived
status as a safe haven for funds.
In this paper, we study the 1998 crisis to investigate diﬀerences across
banks in their ability to manage systematic liquidity risk. We show that
during the 1998 crisis, loan commitments exposed banks to liquidity risk,
whereas transactions deposits insulated them from this risk. First, we re-
port evidence from the equity market that transactions deposits reduce
bank risk exposure, whereas unused loan commitments increase their ex-
posure. We measure risk using stock return volatility observed during the
three-month period beginning in the middle of August, when the crisis be-
gan with the announcement of the Russian default. During this period,
bank stock prices were buﬀeted by news of the Russian crisis, followed by
the demise of the hedge fund LTCM in late September, and ﬁnally by the
drying up of the commercial paper market in the ﬁrst week of October.
Banks with more unused loan commitments had higher risk, whereas those
with more transactions deposits had lower risk. We compare this pattern
with the three months prior to the Russian default, and show a much
smaller correlation between risk and loan commitments or risk and trans-
actions deposits.
Second, we extend the Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) and Gatev and
Strahan (2003) results by exploring in greater detail how bank deposit
growth responded to the 1998 liquidity crisis. We argue that the synergy be-
tween deposits and loan commitments emphasized by Kashyap, Rajan,
and Stein—that banks can reduce risk through diversiﬁcation by holding
demand deposits and loan commitments—becomes especially powerful
during crises, because investors tend to move funds from the capital mar-
kets into their bank during these times. The conditional correlation be-
tween liquidity demanded from depositors and liquidity demanded by bor-
rowers becomes negative during crises, thereby dramatically increasing the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁt of combining these two products. This negative cor-
relation shows up as an increase in funds ﬂowing into bank transaction de-
posit accounts at the same time that funds are ﬂowing out of the bank as
borrowers take down funds from preexisting lines of credit.
As evidence, we test how funding behaved during the ﬁrst weeks of Oc-
tober 1998, when banks faced a dramatic increase in demand for funds
from ﬁrms unable to roll over their commercial paper. This increase in liq-
uidity demand obligated banks to supply funds because ﬁrms had estab-
lished their commercial paper backup lines prior to the onset of the crisis.
We ﬁnd that banks with more transactions deposits as a share of total de-
posits (based on data just before the onset of the crisis) had much greater
inﬂows of deposits, and that all of those inﬂows were concentrated among
transactions deposits rather than other deposits. Banks with more unused
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growth of deposits, which reﬂected their greater demand for funds (result-
ing from takedown demand by their borrowers). We ﬁnd that these rela-
tionships reversed sign at the end of October, as the commercial paper
spreads fell and the market began to function as it normally does—that is,
as the crisis subsided funds ﬂowed out of bank transactions deposit ac-
counts and, presumably, back into the capital markets.
Our results show that transactions deposits play a critically important
role in allowing banks to manage their liquidity risk. The ﬁndings
strengthen the Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein theoretical argument, and they
can help explain the robust positive correlation across banks between
transaction deposits and loan commitments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 following,
provides some background by describing banks’ liquidity insurance role in
the commercial paper market, and describes the chronology of the 1998
crisis. The key issue for our test is ﬁnding the right week(s) when banks
faced a systematic increase in liquidity demand. Section 3.3 then describes
our data, empirical methods, and results. Section 3.4 concludes the paper.
3.2 The 1998 Liquidity Crisis
The focus of this paper is how the banking system in the United States
survived the dramatic decline in risky asset prices during the fall of 1998.
The episode has been called a liquidity crisis mainly because the wide-
spread decline in asset prices did not seem to be fully explainable based on
cash-ﬂow fundamentals. But for our purposes, these events did lead to a
well-deﬁned liquidity crisis in the commercial paper market, because a
large number of borrowers were unable to reﬁnance their paper as it ma-
tured. In response, many of these issuers turned to their bank for funds.
In our ﬁrst set of results, we focus on bank stock return volatility during
the whole three-month period, beginning when Russia defaulted (August
17) and ending after spreads in the commercial paper market returned to
normal levels (November 17). As shown in Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000),
bank stock prices were hit throughout this period by news about condi-
tions in credit markets around the world. We do not model changes in the
level of stock prices, which would require us to pinpoint exactly which
events were viewed as harmful (e.g., Russia’s default and subsequent devi-
ation) or helpful (e.g., announcements that the International Monetary
Fund [IMF] would intervene in Brazil). Instead, we focus on explaining
how the cross-section of stock return volatility, measured throughout the
whole three-month period, reﬂects exposure to liquidity risk as well as a
bank’s ability to manage that risk.
We then analyze the cross-section of deposit changes, focusing speciﬁ-
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month period following the Russian default did raise uncertainty for banks
and bank stock prices (ﬁg. 3.1), it was only during October that banks in
fact faced a sharp increase in liquidity demands. Thus, while forward-
looking stock prices (and hence volatility) over the whole period reﬂected
the eﬀects of the liquidity crisis, bank balance sheets only reacted during
the weeks when liquidity demand spiked.
Bad news began on August 17, 1998, when the Russian government an-
nounced its intention to default on its sovereign debt, ﬂoated the exchange
rate, and devalued the ruble (Chiodo and Owyang 2002). The announce-
ment was followed by a steep drop in U.S. equity prices during the last two
weeks of August, and a sustained period of high volatility in asset markets
around the world (ﬁg. 3.1).
Outside of the U.S. equity market, the prices of risky debt securities
across the whole credit spectrum and across markets began to fall sharply
after Russia’s announcement. As an example, the spread between specula-
tive grade and investment grade debt in the U.S. bond market rose from
about 1.8 percentage points in mid-August to 2.5 percentage points by Oc-
tober. Spreads of risky bonds outside the United States, as well as swap
spreads, also widened dramatically (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).
Partly as a result of the simultaneous collapse in the prices of risky assets
across many markets, the hedge fund LTCM announced to its sharehold-
ers on September 2 that the fund had sustained large losses. These losses
mounted as credit spreads continued to widen, moving well beyond levels
that had been observed during the 1990s. LTCM was unable to secure ad-
ditional investment from its owners or liquidity support from its creditors
(Lowenstein, 2000). As a result, the hedge fund faced the possibility of an
uncoordinated unwinding of its large positions in the bond and swaps mar-
kets. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, fearing the potential sys-
temic consequences of a rapid liquidation of LTCM’s large positions in the
face of already falling asset prices, brokered a private-sector restructuring
of the fund. The news of the restructuring became public on Wednesday,
September 23.5
The eﬀects of these events can be seen clearly in tracking bank stock
prices over this period. Panel A of ﬁgure 3.1 reports the change in an
equally weighted index of bank stock prices and the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 500 from the middle of May 1998 through the middle of Novem-
ber. Panel B reports the conditional volatility over the same period for this
bank-stock index.6 Bank stock prices began to fall in the summer and then
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5. See Edwards (1999) for an evaluation of the policy implications of the Fed’s actions.
6. The conditional volatility (standard deviation) is estimated from an exponential gener-
alized autoregressive EGARCH (1,1) model with a ﬁrst-order auto-regressive process for the
mean (Nelson, 1991).dropped sharply after the Russian default on August 17. Prices stabilized
in September until the announcement of the restructuring of LTCM and
the pull-back in the commercial paper market, then fell sharply again. The
conditional volatility of bank stocks also spiked just after the Russian de-
fault, stabilized in September, and spiked again in the beginning of Octo-
ber. Both the level and volatility of bank stock prices quickly recovered in
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Fig. 3.1 Bank performance from May 14 to November 17, 1988: A, Stock-price
index; B, Conditional stock-return volatility
A
Bthe second half of October. While these patterns are also evident for the
S&P 500, the eﬀects of the 1998 crisis appear larger for banks’ stocks, both
in terms of price levels and return volatility.7
The U.S. commercial paper (CP) market also began to feel the eﬀects 
of investors’ pulling back from risky assets during the week following
LTCM’s collapse. Spreads on short-term, high-grade CP over Treasury se-
curities of comparable maturity had risen gradually throughout the end of
August and through September, from about 55 basis points to about 70 ba-
sis points just prior to LTCM’s demise. Spreads then jumped sharply, ris-
ing to more than 100 basis points and remaining at that level for the ﬁrst
three weeks of October (ﬁg. 3.2). Spreads on low-grade commercial paper
increased even more than spreads on high-grade paper. The jump in these
spreads reﬂected rationing in the commercial paper market, as the stock 
of outstanding commercial paper declined by more than 2 percent during
the month of October.8 Credit rationing places issuers in the position of
facing a liquidity crisis as their paper comes due.9 Chava and Purnanadam
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7. Note that bank stock volatility was lower than the S&P 500 before the crisis, but equal to
or larger during the crisis.
8. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that equilibrium credit rationing is possible when bor-
rowers are better informed than lenders.
9. Such crises had happened before 1998. Banks’ role in oﬀering liquidity insurance origi-
nated early in the development of the commercial paper market when the Penn Central Trans-
portation Company defaulted on more than $80 million in commercial paper outstanding. As
a result of this default, investors lost conﬁdence in otherlarge commercial paper issuers, mak-
Fig. 3.2 Paper-bill spread in BPS May 14–November 17 1998(2005) provide evidence that the CP market ceased to function at the be-
ginning of October, by comparing abnormal returns for ﬁrms with and
without access to this market. They show ﬁrst that stock prices of CP is-
suers fell much less than other ﬁrms in response to the decline in bank ﬁ-
nancial condition during September of 1998 (while markets continued to
function). During the ﬁrst two weeks of October, however, the stock prices
of all ﬁrms, regardless of their ability to access the CP market, fell equally.
Thus, all ﬁrms became bank dependent—even CP issuers—during these
weeks (because markets ceased to function).
At the same time that the CP market was drying up, growth in bank lend-
ing accelerated dramatically, because the commercial paper issuers began
to draw funds from their backup lines of credit. This growth in lending was
concentrated at banks with high levels of undrawn loan commitments
prior to the onset of the crisis. For example, among the top ﬁfty banks,
those with above-average levels of undrawn loan commitments (scaled by
total loans plus commitments) saw lending rise three times as fast as banks
with below-average undrawn loan commitments (Saidenberg and Strahan
1999). Moreover, press reports suggest that most of the bank loan growth
during the beginning of October occurred because of strong takedown de-
mand by commercial paper issuers drawing funds from preexisting credit
lines rather than because of new loan originations. The New York Times
reported, for example, that “rather than signaling a ﬂow of new loans,
much of the lending appears to be borrowers’ drawing on existing lines of
credit” (Uchitelle 1998). Thus, the liquidity crisis moved seamlessly from
CP issuers to their banks. As we show next, banks with larger transaction
deposits were better positioned to face this crisis: they experienced less
volatility in their stock prices and, when the liquidity demands hit hardest,
they experienced the greatest inﬂows of funds.
Expressing concern that “growing caution by lenders and unsettled con-
ditions in ﬁnancial markets more generally [were] likely to be restrain-
ing aggregate demand in the future,” the Federal Reserve decreased the
target Fed Funds rate by 25 basis points on September 29 and again on
October 15, 1998.10 The rate was dropped another 25 basis points on No-
vember 17. It did not stay low for long, however, going back up to 5 per-
cent in two steps by November 1999.
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ing it diﬃcult for some of these ﬁrms to reﬁnance their paper as it matured. The Federal Re-
serve responded to the Penn Central crisis by lending aggressively to banks through the dis-
count window and encouraging them, in turn, to provide liquidity to their large borrowers
(Kane, 1974). In response to this diﬃculty, commercial paper issuers thereafter began pur-
chasing backup lines of credit from banks to insure against future funding disruptions.
10. The announcement can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
monetary/1998.3.3 Empirical Methods, Data, and Results
In this section, we report our results linking stock return volatility and
changes in bank deposits to bank characteristics during the 1998 crisis. We
ﬁrst describe our empirical methods, then our data, and last we report the
results.
3.3.1 Empirical Methods
We test how preexisting open lines of credit and preexisting levels of
transactions deposits aﬀect both risk (stock returns) and deposit ﬂows.
Unused loan commitments expose banks to liquidity risk. Thus, we expect
banks with more open credit lines to face greater liquidity risk (higher
stock return volatility) and to face a greater demand for loans when the
commercial paper market dried up in the beginning of October 1998 (faster
deposit growth). Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein argue that combining loan
commitments with transactions deposits lowers risk due to diversiﬁcation
(because demands are less-than-perfectly correlated). This force is espe-
cially powerful during liquidity crises like the autumn of 1998, because un-
informed investors put funds into banks as a safe haven for their wealth.
Thus, banks with more transactions deposits ought to have had lower risk
than other banks. And when the CP market dried up, such banks ought to
have experienced faster growth of deposits, as funds ﬂowed into their
transactions accounts from investors that would normally buy commercial
paper.
To be more precise, we estimate two sets of cross-sectional regressions
with the following structure:
(1) Stock Return Volatilityi    1    1Loan Commitment Ratioi
   2Transaction Deposit Ratioi
  Control Variablesi   ε1,i
(2) Deposit Changei    2    1Loan Commitment Ratioi
   2Transaction Deposit Ratioi
  Control Variablesi   ε2,i,
where irefers to the bank. We estimate each of these regressions during the
crisis period and during a noncrisis period. For the crisis period, we expect
the following:  1   0 and  2   0;  1   0 and  2   0. For equation (1), we
estimate a noncrisis period that ends in the middle of August; we expect
similar qualitative results but much smaller magnitudes. For equation (2),
we estimate the relationships during the weeks when the CP market dried
up (crisis weeks), and again during the weeks when this market recovered.
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period. Funds should ﬂow into banks as the CP market dries up, and back
out as it rebounds.
3.3.2 Data
Explanatory Variables
To construct measures of liquidity risk exposure and transactions de-
posits we follow the procedures outlined by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
(2002). We use the level of unused loan commitments as of June 1998 (that
is, before the onset of the crisis), scaled by the sum of unused loan com-
mitments plus total on–balance sheet loans.11 This variable is our measure
of a bank’s potential exposure to a liquidity shock.12In our deposit ﬂow re-
gressions, the unused commitments ratio can be thought of as a proxy for
the high level of demand for funds that a bank may need to meet from CP
issuers unable to roll over their paper.
To measure the size of a bank’s transactions deposit base, we use total
transactions deposits divided by total deposits. We take this variable from
the Federal Reserve’s FR2900 (Report of Transaction Accounts, Other
Deposits, and Vault Cash) as of August 10, 1998, the last date prior to the
onset of the crisis. The FR2900 provides conﬁdential and detailed weekly
data on bank deposits used to measure levels and changes in the money
supply.13Some of the deposit components are also used to calculate reserve
requirements. Using a separate data source, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
show that transaction deposits are highly correlated with the loan com-
mitment variable across banks, regardless of bank size. (Note that we also
ﬁnd a very strong positive correlation between transactions deposits and
loan commitments in our data.) They do not, however, test whether trans-
actions deposits in fact help banks hedge against the risks of a liquidity
shock. That is, they do not measure the correlation of liquidity demands
across these two classes of customers. This is where our approach extends
and sharpens their empirical ﬁndings.
Our sample includes all domestic banking organizations with assets over
$1 billion (as of the June 1998 Call Report). We exclude the smaller banks
because most of the commercial paper backup lines of credit are issued 
by large banks, and, as we have said, the liquidity shock was driven by the
absence of liquidity in the commercial paper market. Again following
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11. We alter this deﬁnition slightly relative to what Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein use by tak-
ing out unused loan commitments to retail customers (i.e., credit card lines). These retail ex-
posures did not create liquidity problems for banks in the fall of 1998.
12. Unfortunately, we know of no data that would allow us to observe the amount of funds
actually taken down oﬀof preexisting lines of credit, which would be the best ex post measure
of the shock to loan demand.
13. The conﬁdential data were processed solely within the Federal Reserve for the analysis
presented in this paper.Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, we aggregate the bank-level data from the June
1998 Call Report up to the level of the highest holding corporation. This
aggregation takes account of the possibility that aﬃliated banks can pool
their resources to hedge against unexpected liquidity shocks.
Beyond the two variables of interest, we also control for a series of addi-
tional bank characteristics, including the log of total assets, the capital-
asset ratio, an indicator equal to 1 for banks with a credit rating, the ratio
of liquid assets (cash plus securities) to total assets, the ratio of Fed Funds
purchased to total assets, and an indicator equal to 1 if the bank’s stock is
publicly traded. We include bank size and capital to test whether risk or de-
posit inﬂows are aﬀected by insolvency risk—larger and better-capitalized
banks are less likely to fail, all else being equal. Larger banks may also have
been viewed as safer than smaller ones if the implicit government safety net
is more readily available to them. We control for asset liquidity for the ob-
vious reason that banks with more liquid balance sheets will be better able
to meet the demands of borrowers taking down funds from preexisting
loan commitments. Similarly, banks with greater access to the Fed Funds
market may be better able to weather a liquidity shock. The publicly traded
and rated indicators are included to test whether less opaque banks fared
better during the crisis. Last, we include indicator variables equal to 1 for
banks exposed to Russia and to LTCM (see Kho, Lee, and Stulz, 2000).
Dependent Variables
To measure bank risk, we use three months of daily stock return data
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct the
standard deviation of each bank’s stock return from the onset of the crisis
on August 17, 1998. We construct the same volatility measure during the
three-month period ending on August 14 to obtain a benchmark set of re-
sults to make sure that the relationships we observe during the fall really
have something to do with the liquidity crisis, rather than some time-
invariant characteristics of banks.
For deposit ﬂows, we construct the change in total deposits during the
week ending on October 5, 1998. This ﬁrst week of October follows the re-
structuring of LTCM at the end of September, and was the critical week in
which CP spreads ﬁrst spiked (ﬁg. 3.2). Spreads remained high for an ad-
ditional two weeks, so we also report as a robustness test the change in de-
posits during the three-week period ending on October 19.
For each of our deposit change results, we also report a parallel set of re-
gressions for the week ending on October 26 (the week the spreads began
to subside), and the three-week period ending on November 6, 1998. These
weeks represent a resumption of normal conditions in the commercial pa-
per market. Spreads began to fall after October 16, from a high of 150 ba-
sis points to below 100 basis points by October 26, and then fell below 60
basis points by November 4. We also split the change in total deposits into
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test whether these two kinds of products responded diﬀerently when liq-
uidity demanded by the commercial paper issuers peaked.14 Each of these
changes is normalized by the bank’s total assets as of June 1998.15 As with
the level of preexisting transactions deposits, the data for deposit changes
come from the Federal Reserve’s FR2900 data.
3.3.3 Results
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for our dependent variables (panel
A) and for our explanatory variables (panel B). Bank stocks clearly became
signiﬁcantly more volatile during the fall of 1998, rising from a daily stan-
dard deviation of 2.0 percent for the average bank before the crisis to 3.4
percent during the crisis.16Moreover, the bank deposit change variable was
much higher during the crisis weeks at the beginning of October than dur-
ing the weeks at the end of the month. For example, the change in deposits
relative to assets averaged 1.4 percent during the ﬁrst week of October (cri-
sis period), whereas deposits actually shrank by 0.4 percent of assets dur-
ing the week ending on October 26 (noncrisis period). Deposit change dur-
ing that ﬁrst week of October annualizes to a change of about 70 percent
of assets.
As noted, we take most of our explanatory variables from the June 1998
Call Report, to be sure that they are predetermined with respect to the on-
set of crisis, with one exception: the transactions deposit ratio is taken from
the August 10, 1998, FR2900 data, both to ensure comparability with the
deposit changes, and because we wanted to measure a bank’s transaction
deposit franchise as close to the onset of the crisis as possible.
As reported in table 3.1, a typical bank held unused loan commitments
equal to about 19 percent of its total credit exposure (on–balance sheet
loans plus unused commitments). The transactions deposit variable aver-
aged 0.189, and exhibited a wide range (from zero to 0.49). These are the
two explanatory variables of greatest interest, because they allow us to test
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14. Transaction accounts is the sum of demand deposits, Automatic Transfer Service (ATS)
accounts, NOW accounts/share drafts and telephone pre-authorized transfers.
15. We considered looking at deposit growth, but this variable displays some large outliers,
especially when we disaggregate the deposits (e.g., transaction versus nontransaction de-
posits, and demand versus other transaction deposits). Normalizing the change in deposits
by total assets reduces the outlier problems, but we also trim the deposit changes at the 1st
and 99th percentiles in the regressions reported in this paper. The results do not change ma-
terially for the crisis weeks if we do not trim, but the coeﬃcient on deposit changes during the
noncrisis period becomes much larger (as does its standard error) due to the inﬂuence of one
observation.
16. These volatility ﬁgures are higher than the conditional volatilities plotted in ﬁgure 3.1
because they include bank-speciﬁc idiosyncratic risk. The data in ﬁgure 3.1 are based on an
equally weighted index of bank stocks.the Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein model, which implies that exposure to take-
down risk on loan commitments can be partly hedged with transactions
deposits. Means for the other controls variables are also reported in table
3.1. Average bank size in the sample was $16.5 billion (log of assets aver-
aged 15.23). Two percent of the banks in the sample had exposure to Rus-
sia, and a little more than 1 percent (four banks) of the banks had exposure
to LTCM. Most of the banks are publicly traded (84 percent), but fewer
than half have a credit rating (35 percent).
Bank Stock Return Volatility
Table 3.2 reports the regression estimates for equation (1), where bank
stock return volatility is the dependent variable. During the crisis period,
there is a positive association between the unused loan commitments and
volatility (although not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels), and
a signiﬁcant negative association between the size of a bank’s transactions
deposit ratio and volatility. That is, loan commitments seem to have ex-
How Do Banks Manage Liquidity Risk? 117
Table 3.1 Summary statistics
Crisis period Noncrisis period
Standard Standard
Mean (1) deviation (2) Mean (3) deviation (4)
A. Dependent variables
Stock return volatility 0.034 0.011 0.020 0.006
Change in total deposits/assets6/98 0.014 0.011 –0.004 0.013
Change in transactions deposits/assets6/98 0.004 0.009 –0.002 0.008
Change in nontransaction deposits/assets6/98 0.011 0.015 –0.003 0.012
B. Explanatory variables
Transactions deposits/total deposits 0.189 0.100
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) 0.187 0.127
Log of assets 15.23 1.38
Russia exposure indicator 0.022
LTCM exposure indicator 0.013
Capital/Assets 0.092 0.039
Fed funds purchased/assets 0.068 0.066
(Cash + Securities)/assets 0.324 0.141
Has a credit rating indicator 0.349
Is publicly traded indicator 0.838
Notes: Dependent variables: Stock return volatility equals the standard deviation of daily stock returns.
The change in deposits is taken from the Federal Reserve’s FR2900 data.
Explanatory variables: With the exception of the transactions deposit ratio, explanatory variables are
taken from the June 1998 Call Report. The transactions deposit/total deposits ratio is taken from the Au-
gust 10, 1998, FR2900 data, as are the deposit change rates (the dependent variables).
Crisis/Noncrisis periods:For stock return volatility, the crisis period begins on August 17, 1998, (when
Russia defaulted) and ends three months later. The noncrisis period is the three-month period ending on
August 14, 1998. For deposit change, the crisis week is the week ending on October 5, 1998 (the week
that commercial paper spreads began to subside).posed banks to risk (weakly), while transactions deposits helped them
hedge that risk. The coeﬃcient on the transaction deposits variable is es-
pecially striking. For example, a 1 standard deviation increase in this vari-
able came with a decrease in stock return volatility of 0.004, which is about
40 percent of the cross-sectional standard deviation in stock return volatil-
ity. During the 1998 crisis a bank with a large transaction deposit base ex-
perienced much lower stock return volatility because, as we will show, it re-
ceived a large inﬂow of new deposits. This result highlights how banking
has changed in recent years. Before the introduction of government safety
nets, transactions deposits could sometimes expose a bank to liquidity risk
when consumers simultaneously removed deposits to increase consump-
tion. This bank-run problem has traditionally been viewed as the primary
source of bank liquidity risk and lies behind bank reserve requirements for
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Table 3.2 Bank liquidity risk declines with size of bank’s transactions deposit franchise
Dependent variables
Crisis period stock Noncrisis stock
return volatility: return volatility: 
8/17/98–11/17/98 5/14/98–8/14/98
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Transactions deposits/Total deposits –0.037** –0.008*
(0.011) (0.004)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) 0.010 0.001
(0.011) (0.004)
Log of assets 0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Russia exposure indicator 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.001)




Fed funds purchased/Assets –0.001 0.010
(0.010) (0.006)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets 0.002 –0.004
(0.007) (0.004)




Notes: All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported. Coefﬁcients reported with robust
standard errors in parentheses. With the exception of the deposit ratio, explanatory variables are from
the June 1998 Call Report. The transactions deposit/total deposits ratio is taken from the August 10,
1998, FR2900 data.
**Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.demand deposits. Rather than open banks to liquidity risk, however, de-
posits now seem to insulate them from that risk.
Table 3.2 also shows that the relationships observed during the 1998
crisis do notreﬂect the normal links from liquidity exposure to risk. The co-
eﬃcients on both loan commitments and transactions deposits in the
volatility regressions are much smaller during the noncrisis period, and
this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.17 The eﬀect
of transactions deposits falls by a factor of about ﬁve, and the eﬀect of loan
commitments falls by a factor of ten. Thus, the extent to which combining
loan commitments with transactions deposits helps banks hedge risk was
dramatically larger during the 1998 liquidity crisis than during normal times.
This is consistent with our argument that the conditional correlation be-
tween liquidity demands of depositors and borrowers goes negative during
liquidity crises—depositors put their money in banks just as borrowers
draw money out. In other words, the diversiﬁcation synergy of combining
loan commitments and transactions deposits is especially powerful during
crises.
Banks with LTCM exposure also had much higher stock return volatil-
ity than other banks during the crisis months. Sensibly, LTCM investments
increased bank equity risk, both before and after the Russian default was
announced. This result is consistent with Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000), who
show that LTCM-exposed banks experienced a relatively large decline in
stock prices compared to other banks when the hedge fund’s problems ﬁrst
became public, and again when the coordinated restructuring occurred.18
Our results suggest that the market was aware of potential LTCM risk even
before the news of the fund’s diﬃculties became widely recognized (i.e., the
coeﬃcient is positive even during our precrisis period). This coeﬃcient, of
course, could be capturing more than just LTCM risk, to the extent that
these banks were engaged in other risk-enhancing activities, such as pro-
prietary trading.
Somewhat to our surprise we ﬁnd no eﬀect on volatility of bank size or
the other measures of liquidity risk (the fed funds purchased-to-assets or
liquid assets-to-total-assets ratios). We ﬁnd that banks with more capital
had higher, rather than lower, stock-return volatility. The small coeﬃcient
on bank size indicates that large banks were not viewed as relatively safer
during the crisis, as might be expected if government safety nets become
relatively more valuable for large banks at these times. These results are
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17. In addition, we have estimated the volatility model for the crisis period, with the non-
crisis volatility (i.e., the lagged dependent variable) included as a right-hand side variable. In
these models, the ﬁt (R2) increases, but the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the other
regressors remain similar to those reported in column 1 of table 3.2.
18. The LTCM-exposed banks became equity holders in LTCM after the restructuring.
Note that despite the higher equity risk for these banks, they were probably not close to in-
solvency. Furﬁne (2002) shows that LTCM-exposed banks continued to have access to bor-
rowing in the unsecured Fed Funds market during this period.consistent with our subsequent deposit-ﬂow evidence and with the ﬁndings
of Gatev and Strahan (2003), who show that funds ﬂowed into banks
across the board rather than to large (or well-capitalized) banks.19
Bank Deposit Inﬂows
In tables 3.3–3.6, we report estimates of the links from banks’ transac-
tions deposits base and their total unused loan commitments to deposit in-
ﬂows during the crisis and recovery weeks of the commercial paper mar-
ket. Table 3.3 focuses ﬁrst on total deposit ﬂows. During the ﬁrst week of
October, banks with more transactions deposits (as of the beginning of the
crisis) experienced larger inﬂows of funds than other banks (column [1]).20
Moreover, these funds seemed to have ﬂowed out of banks as the CP mar-
ket recovered during the week ending October 26 (column [2]). Similarly,
we ﬁnd that banks with higher levels of preexisting unused or open loan
commitments had greater inﬂows during the crisis week, and greater levels
of outﬂows during the recovery week. Banks with high levels of open credit
lines thus seem to have experienced the greatest takedown demand, as CP
issuers turned to their banks for liquidity. This liquidity shock is reﬂected by
deposits that were pulled into the bank by high loan demand. Banks with
higher levels of transactions deposits, however, also experienced greater
inﬂows. We interpret this latter inﬂow as a deposit-supply response to the
crisis: when investors lost their nerve, two things happened. First, the CP
market dried up. Second, funds normally invested in commercial paper
ﬂowed temporarily into bank accounts. Thus, banks with high levels of
both open commitments and transactions accounts experienced oﬀsetting
ﬂows of funds.21
Table 3.4 sharpens this result by looking at the ﬂows into bank transac-
tion deposit accounts and into nontransaction deposit accounts sepa-
rately. During the crisis week, the positive correlation between preexisting
transaction deposits and deposits ﬂow shows up only in the transactions
deposits accounts (panel A). That is, banks with a large base of transac-
tions deposit accounts experienced ﬂows of funds into those accounts. In
contrast, there is a negative correlation between the size of a bank’s trans-
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19. Gatev and Strahan (2003) use call report data to analyze the eﬀects of CP spreads and
loan commitments on balance sheet changes at quarterly frequency. Hence, they are not able
to focus speciﬁcally on how deposit growth behaved during the critical weeks in October
when takedown demand by commercial paper issuers spiked.
20. We have also included an indicator variable for four large banks involved in wholesale
payments processing to our model (Bank of New York, State Street Bank, Northern Trust,
and Mellon Bank). These banks did not experience greater inﬂows than other banks.
21. We have also estimated our model for subsamples of above- and below-median size
banks. In both samples, we ﬁnd that deposit ﬂows were greater for banks with more transac-
tions deposits (signiﬁcant for large banks) and more unused loan commitments (signiﬁcant
for smaller banks). The transactions deposit coeﬃcient was slightly larger for the above-
median banks, whereas the coeﬃcient on preexisting unused loan commitments was slightly
larger for the below-median banks.actions deposit base and ﬂows into nontransaction deposits. Also, there is
no correlation between unused loan commitments and ﬂows into transac-
tions deposits.
The results in table 3.4 validate our interpretation of unused loan com-
mitments as controlling for shocks to loan demand (and hence bank de-
mand for funds), whereas the size of the transactions deposit base controls
for shocks to deposit supply.The deposit-supply response to shocks at high
frequency aﬀects the transactions accounts, but demand shocks do not
(hence the lack of correlation between unused lines and ﬂows into transac-
tions accounts). Banks are not likely to be able to fund high-frequency
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Table 3.3 Deposits ﬂow more into banks with larger transactions deposit franchise
Dependent variables
Crisis period change Noncrisis change 
in deposits/Assets6/98: in deposits/Assets6/98:
9/28/98–10/05/98 10/19/98–10/26-98 
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Transactions deposits/Total deposits 0.020* –0.024*
(0.011) (0.010)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) 0.022** –0.016**
(0.010) (0.007)
Log of assets –0.001 –0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Russia exposure indicator –0.010** 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)




Fed funds purchased/Assets –0.002 –0.007
(0.011) (0.010)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Has a credit rating indicator 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004)




Notes: All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported. Coefﬁcients reported with robust
standard errors in parentheses. With the exception of the deposit ratio, explanatory variables are from
the June 1998 Call Report. The transactions deposit/total deposits ratio is taken from the August 10,
1998, FR2900 data, as are the deposit change rates (the dependent variables). The change in deposits is
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
**Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.Table 3.4 Deposits ﬂow more into bank transactions-deposit accounts
Dependent variables
Change in transactions Change in nontransactions
deposits/Assets6/98: deposits/Assets6/98:
9/28/98–10/05/98 9/28/98–10.05/98 
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
A. Transactions versus Nontransactions deposit
Transactions deposits/Total deposits 0.044** –0.035**
(0.009) (0.016)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) –0.009 0.038**
(0.006) (0.015)
Log of assets 0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Russia exposure indicator –0.004 –0.007
(0.003) (0.004)




Fed funds purchased/Assets 0.009 –0.010
(0.012) (0.016)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets –0.008 0.002
(0.005) (0.008)
Has a credit rating indicator 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004)









B. Demand deposits versus all other transactions deposit
Transactions deposits/Total deposits 0.039** 0.004
(0.007) (0.004)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) –0.005 –0.004
(0.006) (0.003)
Log of assets 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Russia exposure indicator –0.004 –0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
LTCM exposure indicator –0.001 0.001*
(0.003) (0.001)
Capital/Assets 0.003 0.006
(0.012) (0.007)demand shocks with transaction deposits unless they experience inﬂows
into preexisting accounts. Banks without such supplies of funds need to re-
sort to other sources when takedowns increase unexpectedly. Hence, in col-
umn (2) of table 3.4 we estimate a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of unused
loan commitments and change in nontransactions deposits. Moreover, the
negative coeﬃcient on the transaction deposits/total deposits variable also
makes sense, because banks with more transactions account ex ante ex-
perienced large increases in funding supply into these accounts (column 
[1]); hence, their demand to raise nontransactions deposits was lower (col-
umn [2]).
Next, we test whether banks are paying higher interest rates for the funds
that ﬂow into their transactions accounts. In table 3.4, panel B, we dis-
aggregate the transactions deposit change into the change-in-demand de-
posits versus the change in all other transaction accounts. These other
accounts include such interest-bearing accounts as negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts. Because banks pay no interest on demand
deposit accounts, we can be sure that the ﬂows into these accounts do not
reﬂect an increase in a bank’s willingness to pay for funds. That is, any
change in these accounts (especially at high frequency, such as one week)
must reﬂect shifts in deposit supply rather than shifts in the bank’s demand
for funds. In fact, we ﬁnd that all of the increased funding ﬂows are con-
centrated in demand deposit accounts rather than other kinds of transac-
tions deposit accounts.
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Fed funds purchased/Assets 0.005 0.005
(0.010) (0.005)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets –0.004 –0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
Has a credit rating indicator 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Notes: See table 3.3.
**Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.4 (continued)
Dependent variables
Change in demand  Change in other transactions
deposits/Assets6/98: deposits/Assets6/98:
9/28/98–10/05/98 9/28/98–10/05/98 
(3) (4)Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the same tests as tables 3.3 and 3.4, but now 
we expand the length of the crisis and noncrisis periods from one week to
three weeks. We consider this test less powerful because the most dramatic
changes in the CP market occurred rapidly. Nevertheless, we again ﬁnd a
positive correlation between banks’ transaction deposit base and subse-
quent ﬂows of deposit funds during the crisis weeks. As the crisis subsided
at the end of October, the regression coeﬃcient remained positive but lost
statistical signiﬁcance. That is, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship between deposit ﬂows and a bank’s transaction deposit base as the
commercial paper market recovered. (This result contrasts with the sign
reversals observed at one-week frequency in table 3.4.) Table 3.6 again
shows that the funding inﬂows related to a banks preexisting level of trans-
actions deposits occurred into transactions accounts rather than non-
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Table 3.5 Deposits ﬂow more into banks with larger transactions deposit franchise 
(three week changes)
Dependent variables
Crisis period change Noncrisis change
in deposits/Assets6/98: in deposits/Assets6/98:
9/28/98–10/19/98 10/19/98–11/09/98 
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Transactions deposits/Total deposits 0.036** 0.058
(0.015) (0.052)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) 0.006 –0.012
(0.010) (0.016)
Log of assets –0.001 –0.005*
(0.001) (0.003)
Russia exposure indicator 0.063 –0.010
(0.048) (0.017)




Fed funds purchased/Assets 0.029 –0.040
(0.019) (0.030)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets –0.016* –0.009
(0.010) (0.017)
Has a credit rating indicator 0.002 0.011
(0.004) (0.008)




Notes: See table 3.3.
**Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.transactions accounts.22 Overall, the results based on the three-week
changes point in the same direction as the one-week changes, but the diﬀer-
ences between the crisis and noncrisis periods are somewhat muted.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper tests how bank equity risk and the supply of deposit funds re-
acted to the liquidity crisis of 1998. During this period, bank stock price
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22. We also ﬁnd some evidence of a negative correlation between balance-sheet liquidity
and ﬂows into bank transactions accounts during the three-week crisis window. It is hard to
explain why bank liquidity would be negatively related to the supply of funds, and since this
result is not robust to our choice of the crisis period, we are hesitant to draw strong conclu-
sions from it.
Table 3.6 Deposits ﬂow more into banks with larger transactions deposit franchise 
(three-week changes; transactions versus nontransactions deposits)
Dependent variables
Change in transactions Change in nontransactions
deposits/Assets6/98: deposits/Assets6/98:
9/28/98–10/19/98 9/28/98–10/19/98 
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Transactions deposits/Total deposits 0.055** –0.012
(0.016) (0.027)
Unused commitments/(Commitments + Loans) –0.020 0.033
(0.010) (0.022)
Log of assets 0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Russia exposure indicator 0.013 0.049
(0.008) (0.041)




Fed funds purchased/Assets 0.010 –0.003
(0.014) (0.029)
(Cash + Securities)/Assets –0.015** 0.013
(0.007) (0.016)
Has a credit rating indicator –0.001 –0.002
(0.001) (0.005)




Notes: See table 3.3.
**Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.volatility increased sharply in response to global shocks to credit markets.
These shocks, which began when Russia defaulted, led to declining asset
prices and widening spreads on risky debt across many markets in response
to an investor “ﬂight to quality.” Spreads on safe securities, such as U.S.
government securities, therefore fell sharply, while the supply of funds to
banks increased. We show that this increase in funding supply was greatest
at banks with large preexisting transactions deposit accounts. This seems
sensible to the extent that investors expected the market uncertainty to be
relatively short in duration. We also show that banks with greater transac-
tions deposit accounts had much lower stock return volatility than other
banks.
Our results extend and deepen our understanding of the deposit-lending
synergy suggested by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002). According to their
model, banks will combine liquidity provision to both depositors (through
transactions deposits) and borrowers (through unused loan commitments)
to reduce risk as long as liquidity demands from these two classes of cus-
tomers are not highly correlated. The motivation for this combination is to
diversify away some liquidity risk and thus reduce the need to hold cash.
Our results suggest that this diversiﬁcation eﬀect becomes especially pow-
erful during periods of crisis, when the correlation in demand for liquidity
by depositors and by borrowers becomes negative. Depositors become net
suppliers of liquidity during crises because they view banks as a safe haven,
just as borrower demands for liquidity are at their highest. We ﬁnd little re-
lation between observable measures of bank safety, such as size, rating, or
deposit ﬂows. Thus, investors seem to view allbanks as equally safe during
liquidity crises (or at least during the 1998 crisis), presumably because of
the presence of government safety nets and backup liquidity from the cen-
tral bank.
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Comment Mark Carey
Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan’s paper is ﬁrst-class research that per-
suasively argues that large commercial banks are uniquely positioned to
act as a stabilizing force during systemic liquidity crises. They present com-
pelling evidence that a large volume of funds ﬂowed into demand deposit
accounts at U.S. banks at the same time that corporations were drawing
large amounts on their lines of credit, and that the volatility of bank stock
prices was smaller for banks with a larger share of transaction deposits
among their liabilities. The evidence is from the period around what is ar-
guably the largest pure liquidity crisis of recent years, the Russian default
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This discussion represents my own opinions, which are not necessarily those of the Board
of Governors, other members of its staﬀ, or the Federal Reserve System.and subsequent collapse of Long-term Capital Management (LCTM) dur-
ing 1998. The authors interpret their results as further evidence of a special
role for banks that only recently has begun to receive more attention in
papers such as Gatev and Strahan (2003) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
(2002). In this view, banks are special because they buﬀer idiosyncratic and
systematic liquidity shocks, both for individual borrowers and depositors
and for the ﬁnancial system as a whole. Banks are able to do so because
both demand for and supply of liquid funds shift in tandem such that indi-
vidual banks are able to manage the net liquidity risk at relatively low cost.
I have no suggestions for improvements to this excellent paper. Instead,
in the remainder of this discussion, I oﬀer observations that amount to sug-
gestions for future research.
One surprise in the empirical results is that very large banks were not
more likely than medium-size banks to experience large ﬂows during the
crisis period. It is my impression that “money center” banks dispropor-
tionately serve ﬁnancial market participants who might have been among
those engaged in a ﬂight to quality, and that they also meet the borrowing
needs of the large corporations that were unable to roll over commercial
paper (or were unwilling to do so, given that commercial paper [CP] mar-
ket spreads were higher than the spreads speciﬁed in their backup lines 
of credit). Even though they are not among the largest banks, some “pro-
cessing” banks, like State Street or Bank of New York, might experience
large deposit inﬂows from entities for which they process ﬁnancial trans-
actions and might balance the liquidity risk by participating in the syndi-
cates that typically provide large backup lines of credit. Such banks might
introduce enough noise into the relationship between size and ﬂows to
make it undetectable in a regression context. It is more diﬃcult to believe
that purely regional banks that serve mainly small and middle-market busi-
ness customers and that rarely participate in syndicated loans would expe-
rience the same impact of a LTCM-style liquidity crisis on loan and deposit
ﬂows. One way to shed light on this issue would be to simply publish a table
that ranks banks by the proportional size of the ﬂows they experience, but
I suspect that Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan could not do this because
of the conﬁdential data they use. Another possibility would be to use loan
syndication data to identify the exposure of each bank to drawdowns on
commercial paper backup lines, using this information in speciﬁcations
similar to Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan’s.
Regardless of the empirical method, a more detailed understanding of
which economic agents are responsible for systemic andsystematic deposit
and loan ﬂows is a key area for future research. We need to know more
about which kinds of events will feature oﬀsetting deposit and loan ﬂows
and which will be more one-sided. For example, what if the events of a cri-
sis lowered rates and spreads on all short-term instruments, including com-
mercial paper, while still causing a ﬂight-to-quality on the part of investors
128 Evan Gatev, Til Schuermann, and Philip E. Strahanin other ﬁnancial assets, like bonds or equities? Flows of bank liabilities
and assets might not be oﬀsetting in such a case. Similarly, loss of conﬁ-
dence in one or more major banks almost surely would lead to withdrawals
of deposits, but might not lead to paydowns of existing loan balances. Case
studies of diﬀerent kinds of events and panel-data studies are likely to be
helpful, and I hope that these and other authors will produce such studies
in the future.
Similarly, systematic relationships between deposit and loan ﬂows might
diﬀer across nations and institutional structures. The U.S. institutional
structure might be particularly supportive of the behavior revealed in
Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan’s paper because commercial paper plays
an important role and because, at least at the time, the details of CP backup
lines of credit locked banks into lending at what turned out to be below-
market spreads. In an environment where banks have more discretion
about making advances and about the rates charged, it is possible that cor-
porations facing rationing in one capital market might ﬁnd it more diﬃcult
or costly to replace the lost funds. And in an environment where ﬁrms de-
pend on banks for almost all debt ﬁnance, rapid ﬂows of deposits into
banks might not be oﬀset by additional lending. This might happen, for ex-
ample, if individuals in a nation of bank-dependent ﬁrms were placing sig-
niﬁcant amounts of savings in foreign vehicles, such as foreign bonds or
mutual funds, and then the individuals lost conﬁdence in the foreign ve-
hicles.
I was also surprised at the authors’ ﬁnding that bank equity volatility
was negatively related to the share of total deposits in transaction deposits,
but was not signiﬁcantly positively related to the share of unused loan com-
mitments in total loans and commitments. I can easily imagine a positive
relationship between unused commitments and volatility: during the crisis,
equity investors might reasonably fear that events would lead to a reces-
sion and that unused commitments might turn into loans to ﬁrms that
eventually default, reducing bank earnings down the road.
It is harder to imagine why the relationship between volatility and trans-
action deposits is so economically large. Even without the deposit inﬂows,
banks in the authors’ sample would surely have been able to fund loan
commitment drawdowns in interbank markets or through discount win-
dow advances at the Federal Reserve (in a period when the Federal Reserve
was targeting the federal funds rate, excess demand in the interbank mar-
ket would simply have led to monetary policy operations that would have
the eﬀect of satisfying the demand). Thus, it is diﬃcult to believe that large
ex ante transaction balances implied smaller “liquidity risk,” because there
was essentially no liquidity risk anyway.
It is possible that volatility in transaction deposit volume translates into
volatility in bank proﬁts and, as noted, the evidence is persuasive that
larger ex ante transaction balances were associated with more volatile bal-
How Do Banks Manage Liquidity Risk? 129ances during the crisis. By construction, transaction deposits in the au-
thors’ data pay no interest, so an increase in such balances must reduce a
bank’s average cost of funds. Even if the bank is forced to place incremen-
tal balances in the interbank market, which is a relatively low-margin in-
vestment, every extra dollar of transaction deposits should add to the
bank’s bottom line. Thus, more volatile transaction deposit balances trans-
late into more volatile proﬁts and more volatile equity prices. But in this
story, the volatility is all on the upside. And it is hard to believe the eﬀect is
nearly as large as the authors ﬁnd, because had the inﬂows into banks been
more long-lived, depositors surely would have shifted into interest-bearing
accounts. Overall, the authors’ ﬁndings represent a signiﬁcant puzzle of in-
terpretation. I hope future research will replicate the result for other
episodes and be able to shed light on the details of the relationship between
bank equity volatility and transaction deposit volumes.
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Discussion Summary
The general discussion opened with a number of questions of clariﬁcation.
Discussion then turned to intuition about exactly how liquidity ﬂows are
embodied during a crisis and whether bank transaction deposits capture
them. Martin Feldsteinasked whether the price of liquidity changes; that is,
whether ﬂows represent a shift in supply or demand. Richard Evans gave
examples of his experience during the LTCM crisis and around September
11, 2001. In both cases, institutions he worked for and other major dealer
banks were ﬂooded with liquid liabilities, and the systemic problem for
commercial and central banks was to rapidly recycle such liquidity to
where it was needed. Ken Abbott observed that the recent appearance of
contingent put options and market-disruption put options may compel
dealer banks that write such options to make substantial payouts during
crisis periods, and thus inﬂows of liquidity would be helpful. Peter Garber
observed that many wholesale depositors likely would turn to repos as a
safe-haven asset during crises rather than deposits, if only because of the
ease with which repos can be arranged. Til Schuermann noted that large
130 Evan Gatev, Til Schuermann, and Philip E. StrahanCD volumes increased sharply at the time of the LTCM crisis, but only at
the shortest maturities.
The remainder of the discussion included a number of suggestions for
the authors, ﬂowing from skepticism that reﬁnancing of commercial paper
is the whole story, as well as technical concerns. Casper de Vries suggested
excluding the banks that had ﬁnanced LTCM in order to limit concerns
about simultaneity bias. Eric Rosengrensuggested close attention to the ex-
perience of banks that specialize in transaction processing, noting that
many banks in the authors’ sample are small and are unlikely to serve com-
mercial paper issuers. Hashem Pesaran suggested including trailing volatil-
ity in regressions, and David Modest suggested using measures of excess
volatility; that is, individual equity volatility net of the change in market-
wide volatility.
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